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Abstract:	  It	  has	  become	  fashionable	  amongst	  International	  Relations	  scholars	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  “autoimmunity”,	  which	  some	  call	  “the	  ultimate	  horizon	  in	  which	  contemporary	  politics	  inscribes	  itself”.	  To	  these	  scholars,	  most	  of	  whom	  draw	  on	  the	  thought	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  such	  logics	  open	  systems	  up	  to	  a	  future	  to	  come.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  tend	  to	  identify	  such	  logics	  with	  Europe,	  America,	  Western	  modernity	  and/or	  democracy.	  Implied,	  and	  sometimes	  explicit,	  in	  their	  accounts	  is	  the	  denial	  of	  autoimmune	  logics	  at	  work	  outside	  such	  an	  imagined	  configuration.	  This	  paper	  challenges	  that	  denial	  through	  arguing	  that	  the	  system	  of	  “harmony”,	  deployed	  in	  contemporary	  China,	  also	  works	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic.	  If	  autoimmunity	  opens	  up	  a	  system	  to	  the	  future,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  so	  for	  European	  democracy	  or	  its	  derivatives.	  Moreover,	  the	  expulsion	  of	  “non-­‐Western”	  others	  from	  accounts	  of	  autoimmunity	  undermines	  their	  rethinking	  of	  difference	  by	  falling	  back	  on	  an	  immunitary	  logic,	  denying	  China	  an	  open	  future.	  This	  exclusion	  is	  their	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  exclusion	  is	  what	  keeps	  open	  their	  promise	  of	  its	  future	  to	  come.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  “non-­‐	  West”	  is	  what	  keeps	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  autoimmune	  “Western”	  or	  European	  democracy	  alive.	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Scholars	  have	  long	  expressed	  concern	  that	  common	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  difference	  in	  and	  beyond	  the	  discipline	  of	  Internetional	  Relations	  (IR)	  close	  down,	  rather	  than	  open	  up,	  alternative	  futures.	  Conceiving	  of	  others	  as	  not	  properly	  different,	  but	  either	  threatening	  or	  just	  behind	  in	  a	  historical	  queue,	  leads	  us	  time	  and	  again	  to	  imagine	  one	  developmental	  path	  where	  others	  will	  soon	  become	  like	  ourselves	  or	  be	  annihilated.1	  This	  type	  of	  thinking	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  change	  and	  a	  positive	  plurality	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  has	  been	  complicit	  with	  colonial	  and	  neo-­‐colonial	  global	  relations.2	  It	  imagines	  one	  single	  future,	  rather	  than	  an	  openness	  to	  a	  plurality	  of	  different	  futures	  that	  may	  come.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  common	  and	  limiting	  way	  of	  thinking,	  scholars	  have	  tried	  to	  rethink	  difference.	  One	  set	  of	  such	  attempts	  have	  clustered	  around	  the	  motif	  of	  autoimmunity.	  Thinking	  about	  “immunity”	  has	  been	  a	  staple	  of	  critical	  thought	  in	  the	  20th	  century,	  and	  autoimmunity	  is	  rapidly	  joining	  it.3	  Autoimmunity	  describes	  a	  double	  process	  whereby	  a	  subject,	  community	  or	  system	  attacks	  or	  threatens	  its	  own	  protection.	  It	  is	  the	  system’s	  own	  logic	  that	  turns	  it	  against	  itself.	  Scholars	  have	  seen	  in	  this	  double	  movement	  a	  different	  way	  of	  imagining	  difference,	  which	  complicates	  the	  logic	  of	  clear	  distinctions	  between	  threat	  and	  protection,	  inside	  and	  outside,	  self	  and	  other,	  that	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  imagination	  of	  those	  definite	  “others”	  as	  expendable	  or	  “just	  behind”.	  Operating	  according	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  intermingeled	  self-­‐defeat	  and	  self-­‐perpetuation,	  this	  logic	  keeps	  the	  system	  alive	  in	  its	  openness	  to	  the	  future	  and	  the	  other.	  Scholars	  have	  therefore	  been	  hopeful	  that	  autoimmunity	  can	  help	  us	  see	  how	  there	  is	  no	  self-­‐identical	  self	  there	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  because	  the	  self	  contains	  elements	  of	  difference	  or	  otherness.	  This	  highlights	  our	  dependence	  on	  others	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  means	  that	  we	  must	  be	  open	  to	  others,	  and	  to	  the	  different	  futures	  that	  they	  may	  bring.	  It	  is	  this	  promise	  of	  a	  genuine	  openness	  to	  the	  other	  and	  to	  the	  future	  which	  has	  drawn	  IR	  scholars	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  “autoimmunity”,	  and	  to	  examine	  such	  logics	  of	  contemporary	  world	  politics.4	  For	  some,	  the	  immunity/autoimmunity	  nexus	  has	  come	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  “the	  ultimate	  horizon	  in	  which	  contemporary	  politics	  inscribes	  itself”.5	  Many	  have	  thus	  deployed	  the	  notion	  of	  immunity/autoimmunity,	  but	  arguably	  “no	  one	  placed	  it	  more	  forcefully	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  contemporary	  politics	  than	  did	  Jacques	  Derrida”.6	  Derrida	  used	  autoimmunity	  to	  describe	  a	  number	  of	  things,	  most	  prominently	  a	  democratic	  system	  originating	  in	  Europe	  that	  in	  seeking	  to	  secure	  itself	  against	  a	  potentially	  dangerous	  future	  violates	  itself	  as	  the	  consequence	  of	  a	  non-­‐recognition	  of	  the	  “other”	  in	  the	  self.7	  IR	  scholars	  who	  have	  drawn	  on	  his	  understanding	  of	  autoimmunity	  also	  share	  an	  empirical	  focus	  on	  logics	  that	  operate	  in	  or	  originate	  from	  a	  cluster	  of	  actors	  or	  activities	  that	  are	  variously	  described	  as	  “Western”,	  “European”,	  “modern”	  and/or	  “democratic”.	  Derrida	  explicitly	  claimed	  that	  the	  self-­‐perfecting	  logic	  of	  autoimmunity	  (and	  the	  open	  future	  that	  comes	  with	  it)	  is	  specific	  to	  such	  a	  geo-­‐politically	  defined	  system.	  The	  empirical	  focus	  of	  the	  wider	  literatures	  that	  have	  drawn	  on	  his	  notion	  to	  date	  have	  done	  little	  to	  challenge	  that	  understanding.	  The	  task	  at	  this	  point	  is	  to	  question	  that	  claim.	  Is	  democracy	  really	  the	  only	  political	  system	  that	  operates	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic?	  Are	  there	  other	  systems	  that	  may	  display	  similar	  logics,	  and	  be	  similarly	  open	  to	  other	  futures?	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  could	  we	  find	  an	  example	  of	  another	  system	  which	  displays	  a	  similarly	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autoimmune	  logic,	  a	  system	  politically	  outside	  what	  is	  commonly	  understood	  by	  “democracy”,	  geographically	  outside	  what	  is	  commonly	  understood	  by	  “Europe”	  or	  “the	  West”,	  with	  origins	  temporally	  predating	  what	  is	  commonly	  understood	  as	  the	  “Enlightenment”	  or	  “modernity”	  that	  is	  said	  to	  have	  inaugurated	  such	  a	  logic?	  What	  implications	  would	  it	  have	  for	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  future	  –	  and	  for	  contemporary	  thought	  on	  autoimmunity	  –	  if	  such	  a	  system	  could	  be	  found?	  In	  answering	  these	  questions,	  this	  article	  challenges	  and	  builds	  on	  previous	  understandings	  of	  autoimmunity.	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  system	  of	  “harmony”,	  as	  deployed	  in	  contemporary	  China,	  also	  works	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic.	  Drawing	  on	  a	  range	  of	  primarily	  Chinese	  language	  texts	  by	  officials	  and	  academics,	  it	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  non-­‐European,	  non-­‐democratic	  system	  that	  operates	  on	  a	  very	  similar	  logic	  to	  what	  Derrida	  and	  other	  thinkers	  of	  autoimmunity	  describe.	  If	  autoimmunity	  does	  indeed	  open	  up	  a	  system	  to	  the	  future,	  this	  is	  not	  only	  so	  for	  European	  democracy	  or	  its	  derivatives.	  The	  article	  furthermore	  explores	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  finding	  for	  thinking	  about	  autoimmunity	  in	  IR	  scholarship.	  The	  article	  progresses	  in	  four	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  autoimmunity	  in	  IR,	  its	  significance	  and	  its	  deployment.	  It	  outlines	  how	  the	  treatment	  of	  autoimmunity,	  particularly	  by	  Derrida	  and	  many	  of	  his	  followers	  in	  IR,	  positions	  an	  “other”	  to	  the	  ”Western”	  or	  “democratic”	  configuration	  they	  understand	  as	  operating	  on	  such	  logics.	  The	  second	  section	  outlines	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  harmony	  is	  conceptualised	  in	  contemporary	  Chinese	  policy	  and	  academic	  discourse.	  It	  explains	  my	  discussion	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  “political	  elite”,	  and	  provides	  evidence	  for	  my	  claims	  from	  official	  documents	  and	  academic	  texts.	  The	  third	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  system	  of	  “harmony”	  currently	  deployed	  in	  China	  can	  indeed	  be	  characterised	  as	  autoimmune,	  and	  discusses	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  this	  finding.	  	  The	  final	  section	  argues	  that	  the	  expulsion	  of	  “non-­‐Western”	  others	  from	  Derrida’s	  and	  his	  followers’	  accounts	  of	  autoimmunity	  undermines	  their	  rethinking	  of	  difference	  by	  falling	  back	  on	  an	  immunitary	  logic,	  denying	  China	  an	  open	  future.	  These	  accounts	  fall	  prey	  to	  a	  logic	  that	  tries	  to	  immunise	  itself	  against	  its	  expunged	  other.	  This	  exclusion	  is	  their	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  this	  sending	  off	  of	  its	  other	  in	  time	  and	  space	  is	  what	  keeps	  open	  the	  promise	  of	  its	  future	  to	  come.	  Put	  differently,	  without	  positing	  an	  “other”	  in	  this	  way,	  there	  would	  be	  nothing	  that	  could	  come	  to	  European	  democracy	  and	  Enlightenment	  thought	  to	  challenge,	  change	  and	  revive	  it.	  Derrida’s	  European	  democratic	  system	  cannot	  stay	  alive	  without	  “killing”	  that	  other,	  and	  simultaneously	  imagining	  its	  (Asian)	  outside	  as	  an	  other	  that	  threatens	  to	  kill	  it.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  “non-­‐West”	  is	  what	  keeps	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  autoimmune	  “Western”	  or	  European	  democracy	  alive.	  
The	  significance	  of	  autoimmunity	  in	  IR	  
The	  logic	  of	  autoimmunity	  and	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  future	  Scholars	  have	  increasingly	  drawn	  on	  “autoimmunity”	  in	  IR	  because	  the	  term	  has	  helped	  them	  to	  think	  about	  alternative	  political	  strategies	  and	  the	  future.	  The	  impetus	  behind	  these	  deployments	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  prevalence	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of	  linear	  thinking	  in	  the	  wider	  social	  sciences.	  This	  conceptualisation	  of	  difference	  is	  problematic	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Most	  immediately,	  it	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  imply	  a	  moral	  yardstick,	  where	  imagining	  others	  as	  behind	  comes	  to	  connote	  their	  lack	  in	  value.	  Moreover,	  it	  often	  implies	  childlike	  qualities,	  which	  in	  turn	  means	  “they”	  need	  to	  be	  guided	  and	  socialised	  by	  “us”.	  Even	  more	  problematic,	  perhaps,	  is	  the	  effect	  this	  move	  has	  on	  difference.	  The	  otherness	  of	  others	  –	  that	  which	  makes	  them	  unique	  and	  ungraspable	  to	  my	  language	  –	  is	  reduced	  to	  graspable	  difference,	  variations	  on	  a	  theme.	  This	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  difference	  has	  serious	  consequences	  for	  our	  ability	  to	  imagine	  a	  different	  open	  future.	  The	  imagining	  of	  one	  single	  developmental	  path,	  where	  others	  will	  eventually	  become	  like	  us,	  robs	  others	  of	  their	  own	  past	  and	  future.8	  It	  turns	  difference	  into	  sameness,	  other	  into	  self.	  “Their”	  future	  is	  no	  longer	  open	  to	  choices,	  it	  is	  already	  inscribed	  in	  the	  story.	  This	  of	  course	  robs	  “us”	  of	  a	  different	  future	  too,	  because	  newness	  must	  be	  impossible	  without	  otherness:	  how	  could	  something	  different	  emerge	  from	  something	  that	  is	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  self-­‐same?	  In	  a	  context	  where	  this	  kind	  of	  thinking	  is	  common,	  various	  scholars	  have	  turned	  to	  logics	  of	  autoimmunity	  to	  better	  understand	  contemporary	  politics.	  Thinkers	  like	  Baudrillard,	  Esposito	  and	  Derrida	  see	  in	  this	  process	  a	  double	  and	  contradictory	  discourse	  of	  concurrent	  immunity	  and	  autoimmunity	  in	  endless	  circulation,	  where	  the	  system	  “conducts	  a	  terrible	  war	  against	  that	  which	  protects	  it	  only	  by	  threatening	  it”.9	  Derrida	  explained	  autoimmunity	  as	  “that	  strange	  behaviour	  where	  a	  living	  being,	  in	  quasi-­‐suicidal	  fashion,	  ‘itself’	  works	  to	  destroy	  its	  own	  protection,	  to	  immunise	  itself	  against	  its	  ‘own’	  immunity”.10	  On	  this	  understanding	  he	  describes	  how	  “the	  West”	  since	  9/11	  operates	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic	  where	  it	  is	  “producing,	  reproducing,	  and	  regenerating	  the	  very	  thing	  it	  seeks	  to	  disarm”.11	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  autoimmunity	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  system.	  However,	  it	  also	  brings	  to	  the	  system	  an	  openness	  to	  the	  future	  that	  keeps	  the	  system	  alive.	  This	  is	  what	  has	  attracted	  many	  scholars	  who	  want	  to	  think	  about	  the	  future	  in	  ways	  that	  do	  not	  fall	  back	  on	  the	  linear	  timeline	  they	  have	  found	  problematic.	  Derrida	  famously	  insists	  on	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  future	  “to	  come”	  through	  highlighting	  the	  connection	  in	  French	  language	  of	  the	  terms	  for	  “future”	  (avenir)	  and	  “to	  come”	  (à	  venir).	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  insists	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  absolutely	  singular	  other	  for	  the	  possibility	  to	  think	  time	  and	  any	  future	  at	  all.	  To	  Derrida	  “[a]	  foreseen	  event	  is	  already	  present,	  already	  presentable;	  it	  has	  already	  arrived	  or	  happened	  and	  is	  thus	  neutralized	  in	  its	  irruption”.12	  Therefore,	  “[w]ithout	  the	  absolute	  singularity	  of	  the	  incalculable	  and	  the	  exceptional,	  no	  thing	  and	  no	  one,	  nothing	  other	  and	  thus	  nothing,	  arrives	  or	  happens”.13	  Put	  otherwise,	  “[w]ithout	  autoimmunity,	  with	  absolute	  immunity,	  nothing	  would	  ever	  happen	  or	  arrive;	  we	  would	  no	  longer	  wait,	  await	  or	  expect,	  no	  longer	  expect	  one	  another,	  or	  expect	  any	  event”.14	  This	  is	  why	  Derrida	  and	  others	  insist	  on	  autoimmunity,	  not	  only	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  system,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  simultaneous	  possibility	  and	  impossibility	  of	  the	  future	  “to	  come”	  (avenir/à	  venir).	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Excluding	  “non-­Western”	  others	  from	  the	  autoimmune	  system	  As	  indicated	  above,	  scholars	  associate	  autoimmune	  logics	  with	  a	  specific	  spatio-­‐temporal	  configuration,	  related	  to	  “the	  West”	  and	  European	  democracy.	  In	  Baudrillard’s	  work,	  it	  is	  European	  democracy,	  the	  modern	  West,	  or	  sometimes	  consumer	  society	  more	  broadly,	  that	  are	  driven	  by	  the	  “perverse”	  logic	  he	  describes.15	  Other	  places	  are	  excluded	  from	  such	  analysis	  in	  an	  attempt	  at	  “radical	  exoticism”.16	  Esposito’s	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  community	  at	  work	  in	  “modernity”,	  a	  term	  that	  many	  understand	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  a	  specifically	  European	  or	  Western	  trajectory.17	  Derrida	  recognized	  that	  groups	  beyond	  such	  a	  cluster	  also	  contain	  autoimmunitary	  processes.18	  Nonetheless,	  and	  despite	  insisting	  that	  his	  claim	  is	  not	  Eurocentric,19	  he	  persists	  in	  privileging	  the	  names	  “Europe”	  and	  “democracy”	  as	  originating	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  that	  he	  takes	  as	  inaugurating	  such	  self-­‐perfecting	  logics.20	  Though	  China,	  for	  example,	  is	  recognized	  as	  joining	  the	  coalition	  formed	  around	  the	  United	  States	  after	  9/11,	  Europe	  holds	  an	  exceptional	  position	  in	  this	  post-­‐9/11	  world,	  because	  Enlightenment	  Europe	  is	  seen	  as	  inaugurating	  the	  self-­‐questioning	  Derrida	  lauds.	  This	  can	  be	  found,	  he	  claims,	  “neither	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  nor	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world,	  nor	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  nor	  even	  …	  in	  American	  democracy”.21	  	  Derrida	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  future	  to	  come	  that	  is	  opened	  up	  by	  an	  autoimmune	  logic	  is	  specific	  to	  Europe	  or	  democracy.	  Derrida’s	  “democracy	  to	  come”	  is	  chosen	  in	  acknowledgement	  of	  his	  debt	  to	  a	  historical	  and	  intellectual	  heritage.	  He	  claims:	  [o]f	  all	  the	  names	  grouped	  a	  bit	  too	  quickly	  under	  the	  category	  ‘political	  regimes’	   (and	   I	   do	  not	   believe	   that	   ‘democracy’	   ultimately	  designates	   a	  ‘political	   regime’),	   the	   inherited	   concept	   of	   democracy	   is	   the	   only	   one	  that	  welcomes	   the	  possibility	   of	   being	   contested,	   of	   contesting	   itself,	   of	  criticizing	  and	  indefinitely	  improving	  itself.22	  	  As	  Kimberly	  Hutchings	  has	  argued,	  this	  argument	  allocates	  universal	  relevance	  to	  Enlightenment	  thinking,	  albeit	  not	  identified	  with	  a	  universal	  end	  of	  history.23	  Victor	  Li	  sums	  up	  this	  attitude:	  “Europe,	  in	  questioning	  itself,	  is	  exceptional;	  European	  exceptionalism,	  moreover,	  seems	  to	  be	  made	  possible	  only	  by	  the	  Muslim	  world	  or	  the	  Far	  East	  acting	  as	  exceptions	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  critical	  questioning”.24	  A	  consequence	  of	  this	  attitude	  is	  the	  outright	  denial	  of	  an	  openness	  of	  the	  future	  in	  these	  other	  systems.25	  Many	  of	  those	  who	  have	  more	  recently	  followed	  on	  this	  thought,	  and	  drawn	  on	  ideas	  of	  such	  autoimmune	  logics	  in	  IR,	  have	  also	  done	  so	  to	  discuss	  issues	  closely	  associated	  with	  a	  similar	  configuration.	  In	  these	  accounts,	  autoimmunity	  appears	  to	  emanate	  from	  “Western”	  practice	  or	  thought.	  Dan	  Bulley,	  for	  example,	  draws	  on	  Derrida’s	  autoimmune	  to	  study	  British	  foreign	  policy	  and	  democracy.26	  Nick	  Vaughan-­‐Williams	  finds	  it	  in	  British	  border	  politics.27	  Bulley,	  Vaughan-­‐Williams	  and	  others	  like	  James	  Brassett	  and	  Marguerite	  La	  Caze	  follow	  Derrida	  and	  study	  it	  in	  recent	  acts	  of	  “terrorism”	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.28	  Goldie	  Osuri	  sees	  it	  in	  orientalism	  generated	  by	  a	  current	  “Western”	  system,29	  and	  writers	  like	  Samir	  Haddad	  and	  Alexander	  J.	  P.	  Thomson	  join	  this	  group	  of	  writers	  to	  explore	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its	  role	  in	  contemporary	  democracy.30	  A	  number	  of	  other	  sources	  could	  be	  cited	  to	  similar	  effect.	  These	  are	  all	  excellent	  pieces	  of	  scholarship.	  They	  show	  that	  contemporary	  scholars	  have	  found	  the	  figure	  of	  autoimmunity	  to	  have	  significant	  explanatory	  value	  in	  a	  range	  of	  areas	  of	  concern	  in	  contemporary	  IR.	  They	  have	  drawn	  on	  the	  notion	  to	  complicate	  binaries	  such	  as	  successful/failed	  states,	  inside/outside	  nation	  states,	  cosmopolitanism/terrorism,	  and	  powerful/helpless.	  The	  most	  unsettling	  insight	  the	  concept	  of	  autoimmunity	  leads	  us	  to,	  as	  aptly	  summarised	  in	  Bulley’s	  discussion,	  is	  that	  “it	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  self	  revealing	  the	  impossibility	  of	  the	  self	  …	  it	  reveals	  that	  there	  is	  no	  self-­same	  self	  in	  the	  first	  place”.31	  Most	  importantly	  for	  the	  discussion	  here,	  all	  these	  thinkers	  identify	  in	  autoimmunity	  an	  opening	  up	  to	  a	  future	  to	  come,	  an	  openness	  that	  the	  linear	  thinking	  about	  time	  tends	  to	  close	  down	  or	  deny.	  These	  discussions	  of	  autoimmunity	  in	  IR	  matter	  because	  they	  have	  contributed	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  these	  phenomena	  and	  because	  they	  have	  pointed	  towards	  new	  ways	  of	  responding	  to	  events	  like	  9/11	  or	  7/7.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  term	  has	  become	  increasingly	  used	  in	  academic	  circles	  is	  also	  a	  reason	  to	  critically	  examine	  its	  effects.	  Taken	  together,	  however,	  these	  discussions	  also	  show	  that	  recent	  writing	  on	  autoimmunity	  in	  IR	  has	  done	  little	  to	  challenge	  its	  Eurocentric	  implications.	  As	  a	  body	  of	  literature,	  they	  are	  very	  much	  focused	  on	  the	  configuration	  of	  “the	  West”,	  particularly	  democracy	  and	  terrorism	  “against”	  (or	  “by”)	  that	  system.	  The	  literatures	  concerned	  with	  autoimmunity	  to	  date	  seem	  to	  imply,	  and	  sometimes	  explicitly	  claim,	  that	  systems	  in	  times	  and	  places	  outside	  of	  this	  configuration	  might	  not	  or	  do	  not	  work	  on	  this	  logic.	  This	  claim	  matters	  because	  of	  the	  association	  of	  autoimmune	  logics	  with	  an	  open	  future.	  	  That	  claim	  then	  needs	  to	  be	  questioned	  at	  this	  point.	  Is	  democracy	  really	  the	  only	  system	  that	  operates	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic?	  Are	  there	  other	  autoimmune	  systems	  outside	  what	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  the	  “modern	  West”	  or	  “European	  democracy”?	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  Chinese	  system	  of	  “harmony”,	  specifically	  the	  “harmonious	  world”	  that	  has	  been	  advocated	  by	  Chinese	  authorities	  and	  scholars,	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  non-­‐European,	  non-­‐democratic	  system	  that	  operates	  on	  a	  very	  similar	  logic.	  
Autoimmune	  logics	  beyond	  “the	  West”:	  China’s	  “harmonious	  world”	  
Harmony	  as	  a	  Chinese	  system	  In	  conjunction	  with	  China’s	  rise,	  scholars	  and	  policy	  makers	  have	  begun	  to	  ask	  how	  a	  rising	  China	  will	  reshape	  international	  norms.	  What	  would	  a	  world	  under	  Chinese	  leadership	  look	  like?	  What	  norms	  does	  China	  want	  to	  promote?	  The	  answer	  many	  Chinese	  officials,	  scholars	  and	  organisations	  have	  given	  to	  these	  questions	  can	  be	  summarised	  in	  one	  word:	  harmony.	  Every	  generation	  of	  leadership	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  has	  used	  set	  phrases	  to	  stamp	  their	  mark	  on	  Chinese	  politics.	  “Harmony”	  rose	  on	  the	  Chinese	  IR	  research	  agenda	  after	  the	  previous	  Chinese	  president	  Hu	  Jintao	  launched	  it	  as	  an	  official	  policy	  concept	  around	  2004-­‐2005.32	  Two	  key	  policies	  under	  Hu	  have	  been	  “harmonious	  society”	  (hexie	  shehui	  和谐社会)	  and	  “harmonious	  world”	  (hexie	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shijie	  和谐世界).	  At	  the	  time	  when	  Hu’s	  harmonious	  policies	  were	  launched,	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  “reform	  and	  opening	  up”	  had	  been	  praised	  for	  bringing	  about	  the	  impressive	  growth	  of	  the	  Chinese	  economy.	  With	  it,	  however,	  came	  growing	  inequality,	  continued	  environmental	  degradation	  and	  social	  unrest.	  Hu’s	  rhetorical	  focus	  on	  harmony	  sought	  to	  calm	  unrest	  which	  risked	  growing	  to	  a	  point	  of	  dangerously	  challenging	  party	  rule.33	  The	  term	  also	  had	  its	  precedents	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  William	  A.	  Callahan,34	  harmony	  was	  related	  to	  policy	  prior	  to	  Hu’s	  major	  reuse	  of	  the	  term,	  both	  in	  academic	  debates	  on	  IR	  and	  wider	  social	  sciences35	  and	  in	  Jiang	  Zemin’s	  speeches.36	  This	  policy	  and	  academic	  discourse	  draws	  on	  a	  long	  history	  of	  thinking	  about	  harmony	  in	  China.	  The	  concept	  has	  a	  central	  position	  in	  Confucian,	  Daoist	  and	  Buddhist	  thinking,	  and	  had	  a	  strong	  influence	  on	  Chinese	  systems	  of	  governance	  for	  millenia.	  The	  operative	  term	  for	  “harmony”	  is	  he	  (和),	  which	  was	  more	  recently	  selected	  as	  the	  Chinese	  character	  that	  “carries	  the	  most	  meaning	  for	  Chinese	  culture”	  by	  a	  popular	  Chinese	  magazine.37	  The	  concept	  featured	  heavily	  in	  the	  line	  of	  propagandistic	  mega-­‐events	  that	  included	  the	  2008	  Beijing	  Olympics38	  and	  the	  2010	  Shanghai	  Expo.39	  In	  academia,	  it	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  “foundational”	  or	  a	  “key	  concept”	  in	  Chinese	  thought.40	  Chinese	  IR	  scholars	  Ni	  Shixiong	  and	  Qian	  Xuming	  exemplify	  this	  attitude	  when	  they	  claim	  that:	  ‘cherishing	   harmony’,	   ‘harmony	   with	   difference’	   and	   such	   thought	  penetrates	   the	   inner	   world	   of	   the	   Chinese	   nation,	   taking	   shape	   in	   the	  Chinese	  nation	  ardently	   loving	  peace,	  upholding	  a	  harmonious	  national	  disposition	  and	  values.41	  	  Harmony,	  then,	  may	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  system	  that	  has	  emerged	  from,	  and	  that	  is	  currently	  operating,	  outside	  what	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  “modern	  West”	  and	  “European	  democracy”,	  and	  which	  predates	  both.	  Today,	  Xi	  Jinping	  has	  taken	  over	  after	  Hu	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Chinese	  party-­‐state.	  Like	  previous	  generations	  of	  leadership,	  he	  has	  deployed	  his	  own	  slogan	  of	  choice,	  the	  “China	  dream”	  (Zhongguo	  meng	  中国梦).	  This	  slogan	  has	  incorporated	  the	  notion	  of	  harmony	  and	  is	  part	  of	  constituting	  what	  Key-­‐young	  Son	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  discourse	  of	  “harmonism”,	  “an	  expression	  of	  the	  ethos,	  identities	  and	  norms	  of	  the	  East	  Asian	  political	  elite	  with	  respect	  to	  national,	  regional,	  and	  global	  governance	  at	  the	  specific	  historical	  juncture	  the	  world	  is	  passing	  through”.42	  The	  political	  elite	  that	  Son	  refers	  to	  incorporates	  policy	  makers,	  academics	  and	  other	  stakeholders.	  Academics	  in	  China	  are	  increasingly	  called	  to	  inform	  senior	  party	  members,	  who	  in	  turn	  inform	  the	  development	  of	  academic	  arguments.	  For	  example	  Hu,	  when	  he	  became	  General	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  2002,	  started	  collective	  study	  sessions	  for	  China's	  top	  decision	  unit,	  the	  Politburo,	  where	  IR	  scholars	  are	  invited	  to	  give	  lectures.	  A	  new	  Foreign	  Policy	  Council	  similarly	  brings	  officials	  and	  scholars	  together.	  Where	  some	  say	  scholars	  act	  as	  mouthpieces	  for	  politicians,	  others	  say	  it	  is	  scholars	  who	  put	  issues	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  and	  act	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  opposition	  we	  see	  in	  liberal	  democracies.	  What	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  the	  leading	  Chinese	  scholars	  discussed	  here	  have	  become	  part	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  that	  has	  expanded	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  to	  include	  increased	  influence	  from	  universities,	  research	  institutes	  and	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other	  intellectuals.43	  Therefore,	  discussions	  of	  harmony	  in	  China	  are	  not	  best	  separated	  into	  “policy”	  and	  “academic”	  discourse,	  but	  analysed	  together	  as	  one	  system	  or	  elite	  discourse	  of	  “harmonism”,	  as	  proposed	  by	  Son.	  Before	  proceeding	  to	  look	  closer	  at	  this	  dicourse	  of	  “harmonism”,	  four	  premises	  of	  my	  analysis	  are	  worth	  highlighting.	  First,	  the	  texts	  I	  examine	  are	  principally	  produced	  by	  “insiders”	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  policy	  discourse	  discussed	  represents	  versions	  of	  harmony	  that	  made	  it	  to	  official	  documents.44	  Most	  scholarly	  materials	  discussed	  are	  written	  for	  Chinese	  language	  audiences	  at	  Chinese	  institutions.45	  Like	  “democracy”,	  “harmony”	  is	  a	  norm	  that	  has	  gained	  widespread	  acceptance	  amongst	  political	  elites	  within	  a	  particular	  system,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  imply	  that	  they	  have	  a	  monopoly	  on	  articulating	  harmony.	  	  Second,	  these	  Chinese	  political	  elites	  do	  not	  themselves	  articulate	  an	  entirely	  uniform	  notion	  of	  harmony.	  Just	  as	  “democracy”	  means	  different	  things	  to	  different	  people,	  discussions	  of	  “harmony”	  represent	  a	  diversity	  of	  opinion.	  Nonetheless,	  just	  as	  “democracy”	  represents	  a	  cluster	  of	  dominant	  ideas	  or	  a	  system	  of	  governance,	  so	  too	  can	  we	  speak	  of	  a	  cluster	  of	  “harmonist	  discourses	  that	  aim	  to	  challenge	  Western	  hegemonic	  discourses	  and	  create	  a	  new	  system	  of	  governance”.46	  	  Third,	  this	  dominant	  version	  of	  harmony	  does	  not	  represent	  some	  truth	  about	  what	  harmony	  “really	  means”.	  Rather,	  I	  focus	  on	  what	  “harmony”	  does	  where	  it	  is	  deployed	  by	  the	  political	  elite.	  I	  pay	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  version	  of	  harmony	  for	  thinking	  about	  diverse	  futures	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  autoimmune	  logics	  outlined	  above.	  Scholars	  argue	  that	  “[t]he	  policy	  discourse	  ‘harmonious	  society’	  and	  its	  foreign	  policy	  alter	  ego	  ‘harmonious	  world’	  has	  become	  the	  defining	  discourse	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  under	  Hu	  Jintao”.47	  “Harmonism”	  thus	  provides	  the	  discursive	  backdrop	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  contemporary	  China,	  just	  like	  elite	  ideas	  about	  “democracy”	  do	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Finally,	  I	  recognise	  here	  that	  all	  analysis	  must	  start	  from	  some	  position,	  and	  that	  that	  position	  is	  in	  some	  way	  arbitrary.	  	  In	  critiquing	  recent	  thought	  on	  autoimmunity	  for	  excluding	  China	  I	  do	  not	  suggest	  that	  a	  body	  of	  thought	  could	  achieve	  wholeness	  without	  exclusions.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  focus	  on	  China	  in	  this	  article	  is	  only	  achieved	  by	  other	  exclusions.	  	  Nor	  does	  Derridean	  deconstruction	  pretend	  to	  be	  able	  to	  do	  without	  exclusion,	  but	  rather	  shed	  light	  on	  it	  and	  thereby	  put	  it	  eternally	  in	  question.48	  Yes,	  this	  article	  shows	  that	  Derrida	  is	  factually	  wrong	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  only	  Europe	  or	  democracy	  works	  on	  an	  autoimmune	  logic.	  Nonetheles,	  what	  is	  attempted	  here	  is	  not	  primarily	  a	  criticism	  of	  recent	  thought	  on	  autoimmunity	  for	  excluding	  China,	  but	  a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  possibilities	  that	  are	  created	  when	  this	  exclusion	  is	  ‘brought	  back	  in’.	  	  What	  I	  hope	  my	  examination	  will	  achieve	  is	  to	  make	  visible	  the	  instability	  and	  impossibility	  of	  the	  wholeness	  that	  is	  aimed	  at	  in	  the	  harmony	  concept.	  	  Thus,	  whilst	  acknoweldging	  my	  own	  arbitrary	  starting	  point,	  the	  analysis	  here	  of	  both	  harmonious	  world	  and	  autoimmunity	  aims	  to	  show	  the	  “snags,	  tears,	  and	  portals,	  inviting	  alternative	  paths”,49	  that	  may	  offer	  room	  for	  “thinking	  otherwise”.50	  	  
From	  harmony-­with-­difference	  to	  exclusive	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Hu	  made	  his	  definite	  launch	  of	  the	  “harmonious	  world”	  concept	  to	  the	  UN	  at	  its	  60th	  anniversary	  summit	  in	  2005:	  [w]e	  should	  do	  away	  with	  misgivings	  and	  estrangement	  existing	  between	  civilizations	  and	  make	  humanity	  more	  harmonious	  and	  our	  world	  more	  colorful.	  We	  should	  endeavor	  to	  preserve	  the	  diversity	  of	  civilizations	  in	  the	   spirit	   of	   equality	   and	   openness,	   make	   international	   relations	  more	  democratic	   and	   jointly	   build	   towards	   a	   harmonious	   world	   where	   all	  civilizations	  coexist	  and	  accommodate	  each	  other.51	  	  In	  December	  the	  same	  year	  a	  white	  paper	  titled	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  
Road	  was	  published,	  expanding	  on	  the	  concept,52	  and	  in	  October	  2007	  the	  17th	  National	  Congress	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  wrote	  the	  concept	  into	  its	  constitution,	  calling	  for	  the	  building	  of	  “a	  harmonious	  world	  characterized	  by	  sustained	  peace	  and	  common	  prosperity”.53	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  UN,	  Hu	  wanted	  to	  associate	  “harmony”	  with	  norms	  of	  diversity	  and	  multiplicity	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  A	  number	  of	  texts	  have	  since	  developed	  the	  idea	  that	  “harmonious	  world”	  should	  build	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  “harmony	  with	  difference”	  or	  “harmony	  without	  uniformity”	  (he	  er	  butong	  和而不同).54	  In	  2011	  a	  second	  white	  paper	  was	  issued	  on	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development,	  which	  has	  since	  been	  widely	  cited	  and	  emphasised	  in	  the	  PRC’s	  foreign	  policy	  work,	  including	  ministers’	  and	  ambassadors’	  speeches.55	  This	  white	  paper	  reiterated	  the	  themes	  of	  the	  previous	  reports,	  including	  the	  appreciation	  of	  “harmony	  with	  difference”:	  [t]he	   Chinese	   people	   have	   always	   cherished	   a	   world	   view	   of	   ‘unity	  without	  uniformity,’	   ‘harmony	  between	  man	  and	  nature,’	   and	   ‘harmony	  is	   invaluable.’	   ...	   Under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   culture	   of	   harmony,	   peace-­‐loving	  has	  been	  deeply	  ingrained	  in	  the	  Chinese	  character.…	  Imbued	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  one	  should	  be	  as	  inclusive	  as	  the	  vast	  ocean	  which	  admits	  hundreds	   of	   rivers,	   the	   Chinese	   nation	   has	   embraced	   all	   that	   is	   fine	   in	  foreign	  cultures….	  The	  Chinese	  people	  have	  inherited	  the	  fine	  tradition	  of	  Chinese	  culture	  of	  over	  5,000	  years	  and	  added	   to	   it	  new	  dimensions	  of	  the	  times.56	  	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  academic	  literatures	  on	  harmony	  and	  harmonious	  world	  also	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  multiplicity	  and	  heterogeneity	  for	  proper	  harmony.57	  Many	  texts	  deploy	  the	  term	  “harmony	  with	  difference”	  to	  express	  the	  need	  for	  difference	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  balance	  of	  separate	  elements	  that	  is	  harmony.58	  Respecting	  cultural	  multiplicity	  is	  emphasised	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  a	  harmonious	  world	  and	  the	  development	  of	  “the	  civilisation	  of	  humanity”.59	  One	  proponent	  of	  harmonious	  world,	  Wang	  Yiwei,	  offers	  the	  concept	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  problematic	  time-­‐space	  conceptualisation	  of	  difference	  in	  “Western	  thought”:	  [i]n	   their	   [Westerners’]	   view,	   patriotism	   and	   nationalism	   became	  separated	   into	   symbolically	   advanced	   and	   backward,	   sameness	   and	  difference.	   This	   is	   a	   typical	   case	   of	   the	   ‘logic	   of	   taking	   initiative’,	   the	  implication	   is	   ‘your	   life	   is	   in	   our	   history’	   …	   Therefore,	   under	   the	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hegemonic	   speech	   system	   of	   the	   contemporary	  world,	   nationalism	   has	  already	   been	   derided	   by	   the	   strong,	   just	   as	   though	   a	   piece	   of	   clothing,	  worn	  out	  by	  developed	  countries,	  was	  tossed	  to	  developing	  countries.60	  	  There	  is	  a	  concern	  here	  with	  the	  problematic	  imagination	  of	  other	  as	  “behind”	  to	  which	  many	  of	  the	  texts	  that	  discuss	  autoimmunity	  also	  respond.	  Despite	  this	  concern,	  a	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  literatures	  on	  harmonious	  world	  repeat	  similarly	  problematic	  moves,	  for	  example	  through	  arguing	  that	  “harmonious	  world”	  is	  a	  “natural	  extension	  and	  development”	  of	  “harmonious	  society”,	  where	  China	  builds	  harmonious	  society	  in	  the	  external	  arena.61	  	  As	  the	  quote	  above	  from	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  has	  already	  indicated,	  policy	  discourse	  also	  incorporates	  a	  strong	  and	  repeated	  suggestion	  that	  “China”	  has	  privileged	  access	  to	  a	  “proper”	  understanding	  of	  harmony,	  and	  is	  leading	  the	  world	  towards	  this	  end	  goal.	  In	  the	  same	  white	  paper,	  this	  form	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world	  carries	  forward	  the	  Chinese	  historical	  and	  cultural	  tradition:	  [t]he	  world	  has	  been	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  harmonious	  whole	  in	  the	  Chinese	  culture	  ever	  since	   the	  ancient	   times.	  This	  belief	  has	  a	   lasting	   impact	  on	  the	  thinking	  and	  acts	  of	  the	  Chinese	  nation,	  which	  is	  an	  important	  value	  that	   the	   Chinese	   people	   follow	   in	   handling	   interpersonal	   relationships,	  the	   relationship	   between	   man	   and	   nature	   and	   relations	   between	  different	  countries.62	  	  Similarly,	  in	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  Road’s	  elaboration	  of	  harmony,	  “China	  is	  working	  hard	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  just	  and	  rational	  new	  international	  political	  and	  economic	  order”	  and	  is	  “working	  harder	  to	  get	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  to	  understand	  China”.63	  Harmony,	  here,	  is	  a	  value	  specific	  to	  the	  Chinese	  people,	  state	  and	  civilisation,	  because	  of	  history.64	  It	  is	  something	  that	  “China”	  understands,	  but	  that	  others	  need	  to	  be	  taught.	  In	  such	  linear	  writing	  about	  harmonious	  world,	  a	  number	  of	  these	  texts	  explicitly	  deploy	  the	  imagery	  of	  “backwards	  countries”	  or	  “countries	  lagging	  behind”.65	  Together	  with	  China’s	  “basic	  conditions”	  and	  its	  fundamental	  national	  and	  long-­‐term	  interests,	  the	  alleged	  Chinese	  cultural	  predisposition	  to	  harmony	  is	  said	  to	  have	  created	  the	  “innate	  force”	  driving	  China’s	  peaceful	  development.	  Its	  vision	  of	  a	  harmonious	  world	  is	  said	  to	  align	  with	  the	  “global	  trend”,	  where	  “those	  who	  go	  along	  with	  it	  will	  prosper	  and	  those	  who	  go	  against	  it	  will	  perish”.66	  Once	  the	  story	  has	  been	  told,	  or	  more	  often	  the	  assumption	  has	  been	  made,	  of	  “China”	  and	  (some)	  Chinese	  having	  privileged	  access	  to	  harmony,	  it	  seems	  only	  natural	  that	  China’s	  elites	  should	  be	  the	  forerunners	  of	  global	  harmonisation.	  Accordingly,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  scholars	  are	  explicit	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  harmony	  theory,	  or	  sometimes	  what	  they	  see	  as	  Confucianism	  more	  broadly,	  is	  the	  “ultimate	  goal	  of	  harmonizing	  the	  world”.67	  To	  achieve	  such	  harmonisation,	  starting	  from	  a	  world	  of	  contradiction	  and	  difference,	  contradiction	  needs	  to	  be	  resolved.68	  To	  Liu	  Dongjian,	  for	  example:	  to	   realise	   harmonious	   society,	   the	  most	   important	   thing	   is	   the	   need	   to	  properly	   harmonise	   the	   relationships	   of	   three	   aspects,	   namely:	   the	  contradiction	   between	   people	   and	   nature,	   the	   contradiction	   between	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people	   and	   people,	   the	   contradiction	   between	   the	   people	   and	   the	  government.	  If	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  achieve	  a	  proper	  resolution	  to	  these	  three	  aspects	  of	  contradiction,	  then	  there	  can	  be	  a	  society	  facing	  harmony.69	  	  Although	  he	  at	  first	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  see	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  final	  resolution	  to	  contradiction	  that	  Liu’s	  “harmonise”	  seems	  to	  imply,	  Qin	  Yaqing	  also	  argues	  that	  only	  the	  melting	  away	  of	  contradictions	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  harmonious	  world:	  harmonious	   world	   is	   also	   an	   order	   that	   incessantly	   melts	   away	  contradictions.	   International	   society	   inevitably	   realises	   all	   sorts	   of	  contradictions,	   old	   contradictions	   are	   resolved,	   new	   contradictions	   can	  appear	  again,	  the	  era	  of	  globalisation	  is	  especially	  this	  way.70	  	  Yet	  the	  appeal	  of	  solutions	  is	  strong	  also	  for	  Qin,	  and	  solutions	  remain	  to	  him	  the	  key	  point	  of	  harmony	  in	  the	  text:	  “only	  by	  constructing	  a	  harmonious	  justice	  foundation	  for	  common	  existence	  and	  common	  development	  can	  the	  fundamental	  problems	  of	  international	  society	  be	  genuinely	  resolved”.71	  Similarly,	  to	  Wang	  Yizhou,	  there	  is	  increasing	  possibility	  in	  a	  harmonious	  world	  to	  use	  international	  law	  and	  practice	  to	  resolve	  differences.72	  Wang,	  Liu	  and	  Qin	  take	  somewhat	  different	  views	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  contradiction,	  but	  they	  share	  with	  each	  other	  (and	  with	  the	  literatures	  on	  harmonious	  world	  more	  generally)	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  resolution	  of	  contradiction	  and	  divergence.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  scholars	  who	  analyze	  harmony	  to	  begin	  by	  stressing	  that	  it	  should	  be	  a	  tolerant,	  open	  and	  equal	  form	  of	  “harmony	  with	  difference”,	  only	  to	  go	  on	  and	  list	  the	  ideas	  or	  ways	  of	  life	  that	  should	  definitely	  be	  excluded,	  rejected	  and/or	  transformed	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  or	  protect	  harmony.	  For	  example,	  Qin	  Zhiyong	  argues	  that	  ways	  of	  being	  as	  diverse	  as	  “extreme	  individualism,	  money	  worship,	  hedonism,	  Anarchist	  mentality	  and	  concept	  in	  the	  Western	  culture	  are	  resolutely	  to	  be	  guarded	  against	  and	  rejected”.73	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Ni	  Shixiong	  and	  Qian	  Xuming	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  respect	  civilisational	  differences,	  but	  oppose	  (those	  we	  designate	  as)	  terrorists	  and	  make	  everyone	  understand	  China	  (or	  China’s	  view),	  whilst	  accepting	  only	  
advanced	  culture	  in	  China.74	  Notable	  here	  is	  that	  Ni	  and	  Qian	  are	  writing	  in	  Chinese	  to	  a	  Chinese	  audience,	  who	  will	  be	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  who	  are	  “terrorists”	  in	  contemporary	  China	  –	  those	  imagined	  as	  ethno-­‐civilisational	  others	  in	  border	  regions	  like	  Tibet	  and	  Xinjiang	  who	  are	  seeking	  autonomy	  from	  Chinese	  rule.	  The	  culture	  associated	  with	  these	  groups	  are	  also	  regularly	  portrayed	  as	  “backward”	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  “advanced”	  cultures	  that	  should	  be	  accepted.75	  Kam	  Por	  Yu	  also	  stresses	  that	  harmony	  is	  not	  unprincipled	  compromise,	  and	  endorses	  Confucius’	  view	  that	  “the	  gentleman	  stands	  his	  ground,	  and	  is	  not	  moved	  by	  popular	  opinions,	  much	  less	  be	  shaped	  by	  them”,	  which	  is	  why	  “the	  
right	  kind	  of	  harmony	  is	  achieved	  by	  referring	  to	  some	  principles	  of	  proper	  conduct	  …	  [n]ot	  all	  claims	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  equal”.76	  Another	  article	  by	  Ding	  Sheng	  draws	  on	  Mencius	  as	  a	  thinker	  whose	  ideal	  is	  a	  king	  that	  through	  benevolence	  has	  “no	  rivals	  in	  the	  world”.77	  To	  Confucius,	  writes	  Ding,	  the	  virtue	  of	  noble	  families	  is	  that	  they	  “do	  not	  worry	  about	  poverty,	  but	  worry	  about	  discontent”.78	  He	  quotes	  Sunzi’s	  notion	  that	  “to	  subjugate	  the	  enemy’s	  army	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without	  doing	  battle	  is	  the	  highest	  of	  excellence”.79	  We	  can	  see	  this	  attitude	  mirrored	  in	  Chinese	  society	  under	  CCP	  rule	  today.	  The	  CCP	  has	  overseen	  a	  remarkable	  shift	  in	  economic	  governance	  that	  has	  pulled	  astonishing	  numbers	  of	  people	  out	  of	  poverty	  (where,	  admittedly,	  it	  may	  be	  argued	  they	  found	  themselves	  because	  of	  the	  CCP	  in	  the	  first	  place).	  It	  appears,	  however,	  that	  the	  party-­‐state’s	  main	  response	  to	  China’s	  income	  inequality	  has	  been	  to	  push	  for	  further	  growth	  accompanied	  by	  campaigns	  to	  be	  “harmonious”	  rather	  than	  envious	  of	  others.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  may	  be	  the	  nationalist	  “eight	  honours	  and	  eight	  shames”	  campaign	  (ba	  rong,	  ba	  chi),	  which	  urged	  China’s	  citizens	  to	  build	  a	  harmonious	  socialist	  society	  by	  “living	  plainly,	  working	  hard”	  .80	  
Harmony	  as	  holism	  and	  assimilation	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  above,	  many	  of	  those	  who	  articulate	  harmony	  in	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elite	  discourse	  equate	  “harmonious”	  with	  “consensual”.81	  Literatures	  on	  harmony	  moreover	  typically	  stress	  the	  values	  they	  associate	  it	  with	  as	  “the	  only	  correct	  goal	  and	  the	  only	  reachable	  goal”,82	  or	  argue,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  “harmonious	  world”,	  that	  “choosing	  ‘peaceful	  rise’	  is	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  China’s	  voluntary	  action,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  is	  an	  inevitable	  choice”.83	  The	  idea	  of	  harmony	  as	  an	  “inevitable	  choice”	  is	  prominent	  also	  in	  policy	  documents,	  where	  the	  2005	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  Road	  states	  that	  China	  “endeavors	  to	  play	  a	  constructive	  and	  locomotive	  role”	  and	  “strive	  constantly	  to	  …	  promote	  human	  civilization	  and	  progress”.84	  The	  “inevitability”	  of	  this	  endeavor	  is	  again	  based	  on	  the	  particularism	  of	  Chinese	  history	  and	  culture:	  [i]t	   is	   an	   inevitable	   choice	   based	   on	   China’s	   historical	   and	   cultural	  tradition	  that	  China	  persists	  unswervingly	  in	  taking	  the	  road	  of	  peaceful	  development.	   The	   Chinese	   nation	   has	   always	   been	   a	   peace-­‐loving	   one.	  Chinese	  culture	   is	  a	  pacific	  culture.	  The	  spirit	  of	   the	  Chinese	  people	  has	  always	  featured	  their	  longing	  for	  peace	  and	  pursuit	  of	  harmony.85	  	  In	  2011	  China’s	  Peaceful	  Development	  also	  placed	  renewed	  emphasis	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  “China’s	  Path	  of	  Peaceful	  Development	  Is	  a	  Choice	  Necessitated	  by	  History”.86	  	  Taking	  this	  notion	  back	  to	  Kam	  Por	  Yu’s	  and	  Ding	  Sheng’s	  proposals	  above,	  the	  idea	  of	  their	  vision	  of	  harmony	  as	  an	  “inevitable	  choice”	  lends	  an	  uncompromising	  edge	  to	  the	  argument.	  Not	  only	  is	  there	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  literatures	  on	  harmonious	  world	  to	  fear	  discord	  and	  opposition.	  The	  insistence	  by	  many	  on	  harmony	  as	  a	  tolerant,	  open	  and	  equal	  form	  of	  “harmony	  with	  difference”	  is	  laudable,	  but	  it	  is	  all	  too	  often	  undermined	  by	  positioning	  harmonious	  world	  as	  the	  inevitable	  endpoint	  of	  development.	  Once	  harmonious	  world	  has	  been	  positioned	  as	  the	  only	  correct	  goal,	  the	  temptation	  is	  to	  start	  singling	  out	  disharmonious	  elements,	  those	  who	  harbour	  “terrorist”	  intentions	  or	  lack	  “advanced”	  culture	  to	  contribute	  with.	  Indeed,	  the	  openness	  and	  friendly	  interaction	  between	  cultural,	  national	  and	  civilisational	  units	  is	  still	  based	  on	  some	  principles	  of	  proper	  conduct.	  As	  Yu	  tells	  us,	  these	  principles	  must	  not	  be	  defined	  by	  popular	  opinion.	  The	  overwhelming	  sense	  we	  are	  left	  with,	  instead,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  those	  who	  properly	  understand	  harmony	  that	  must	  decide	  on	  those	  principles,	  on	  whose	  claims	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  equal.	  There	  are	  strong	  assertions	  that	  the	  Chinese	  have	  privileged	  access	  to	  such	  understanding,	  but	  that	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(some	  of)	  its	  population	  consists	  of	  backwards	  low-­‐quality	  people	  whose	  opinions	  should	  not	  sway	  the	  mind	  of	  the	  sagely	  “gentleman”.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elites	  that	  developed	  “harmonious	  society”	  and	  “harmonious	  world”	  are	  to	  decide	  on	  such	  standards.	  Acting	  harmoniously,	  in	  such	  a	  story,	  means	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  discordant	  with	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Chinese	  political	  elites.	  If	  everyone	  behaves	  harmoniously,	  an	  end-­‐state	  can	  be	  imagined	  where	  everyone	  complies	  with,	  or	  is	  co-­‐opted	  by,	  the	  Chinese	  elite’s	  notion	  of	  what	  is	  an	  advanced	  culture	  and	  a	  “win-­‐win”	  solution:	  a	  harmonious	  world.	  As	  in	  Ding’s	  account,	  it	  is	  a	  state	  where	  any	  enemies	  or	  opponents	  have	  been	  subjugated	  and	  thus	  vanished	  as	  such.	  This	  is	  an	  attitude	  recognisable	  from	  policy	  documents,	  where	  the	  point	  of	  “active	  communication”	  and	  “enhanced	  cooperation”	  is	  to	  create	  a	  form	  of	  harmonious	  relation	  that	  meant	  “elimination	  of	  differences”.87	  In	  practice,	  this	  “elimination	  of	  differences”	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  feared	  by	  many	  from	  China’s	  ethnic	  minorities,	  particularly	  in	  areas	  like	  Xinjiang	  where	  relations	  have	  been	  frought	  and	  violent.	  In	  these	  areas,	  many	  in	  the	  Uyghur	  ethnic	  minority	  population	  resent	  attempts	  at	  being	  integrated	  into	  the	  party-­‐state’s	  vision	  of	  “ethnic	  unity”	  on	  Han	  Chinese	  terms.88	  From	  the	  above	  discussion,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  “harmony”	  is	  not	  simply	  considered	  a	  local	  affair.	  Instead,	  we	  end	  up	  with	  a	  holistic	  idea	  of	  harmony.	  To	  some	  authors,	  holism	  is	  based	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  “harmonism”	  (hehe	  zhuyi	  和合主义),	  which	  one	  author	  describes	  as	  follows:	  in	   Chinese	   culture,	   ‘harmony’	   (he	  和)	   has	   many	   layers	   of	   meaning	   of	  ‘kindness’	   (heqi	  和气),	   ‘reconciliation’	   (hehao	  和好),	   ‘amity’	   (hemu	  和睦),	  ‘peace’	   (heping	  和平),	   and	   so	   on,	   and	   ‘unity’	   (he	  合)	   also	   has	   the	   many	  layers	  of	  meaning	  of	  ‘merging	  into	  one’	  (heyi	  合一),	  ‘being	  agreeable’	  (heyi	  
合意),	  ‘co-­‐operating’	  (hezuo	  合作).89	  	  In	  this	  combination,	  a	  concept	  of	  harmony	  is	  used	  that	  emphasises	  “merging	  into	  one”	  or	  “unification”.	  Following	  on	  such	  an	  understanding,	  Fang	  Xiaojiao	  claims	  that	  harmonious	  world	  builds	  on	  a	  feeling	  of	  Tianxia-­‐ism.90	  Tianxia	  litterally	  means	  “All-­‐under-­‐heaven”,	  and	  refers	  to	  an	  Ancient	  Chinese	  understanding	  of	  world	  order,	  which	  has	  been	  recently	  re-­‐deployed	  as	  a	  “better”	  understanding	  of	  world	  order.91	  Fang	  describes	  Tianxia-­‐ism	  as:	  admitting	   differences,	   stressing	   that	   different	   civilisations,	   states	   of	  different	  development	  levels,	  different	  social	  systems	  and	  ideologies	  can	  get	  along	   in	  harmony	  and	  peace.	  This	  kind	  of	  peaceful	   thought	  respects	  multiplicity	   and	   difference,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   unification	   of	   Tianxia,	   but	   is	  mutual	  forgiveness,	  mutual	  respect.92	  	  Despite	  this	  recognition	  and	  seeming	  rejection	  of	  Tianxia	  as	  a	  form	  of	  holism,	  however,	  harmonious	  world	  is	  then	  said	  to	  incorporate	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  self	  and	  other:	  in	   this	   sense,	   the	   thought	   embodied	   in	   harmonious	  world	   expressed	   a	  new	  concept	  of	  Chinese	  diplomacy,	   it	   is	  Chinese	   traditional	   culture	  and	  universal	   world	   value	   notion,	   China’s	   own	   interest	   and	   the	   other’s	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interest,	  the	  outcome	  of	  combining	  the	  goal	  of	  harmony	  and	  the	  method	  of	  peace.93	  	  Similarly,	  to	  Li	  Baojun	  and	  Li	  Zhiyong,	  Tianxiaism	  means	  an	  identification	  with	  all	  of	  humankind,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  differentiation	  or	  distinction	  between	  people	  and	  no	  ethno-­‐national	  classification.94	  	  There	  is	  then	  an	  emphasis	  on	  wanting	  to	  preserve	  diversity	  of	  some	  sort,	  but	  the	  proud	  declaration	  that	  the	  Chinese	  “nation	  has	  embraced	  all	  that	  is	  fine	  in	  foreign	  cultures”	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  (foreign)	  cultures	  that	  were	  not	  deemed	  “fine”	  by	  China’s	  political	  elites.	  Elsewhere,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  “mutual	  learning”	  and	  “integration”	  that	  the	  party-­‐state	  calls	  “harmony”	  may	  have	  a	  decidedly	  less	  “equal”	  or	  “democratic”	  appearance	  than	  what	  is	  immediately	  obvious.	  When	  discussing	  the	  harmony	  of	  “ethnic	  unity”,	  for	  example,	  a	  2009	  white	  paper	  demands:	  all	  China’s	  ethnic	  groups,	  in	  the	  big	  family	  of	  the	  unified	  motherland	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality,	  are	  required	  to	  …	  promote	  peaceful	  coexistence	  and	   harmonious	   development,	   continuously	   strengthen	   and	   develop	  socialist	  ethnic	  relations	  based	  on	  equality,	  solidarity,	  mutual	  assistance	  and	  harmony,	   devote	   all	   to	   the	   construction	  of	   socialist	  modernization,	  and	  make	  our	  country	  strong,	  our	  nation	  thrive	  and	  our	  people	  happy.95	  	  The	  proposition,	  then,	  is	  that	  all	  should	  be	  equal,	  but	  that	  they	  should	  be	  so	  according	  to	  the	  party-­‐state’s	  standards	  (as	  expressed	  in	  slogans	  and	  concepts	  like	  “peaceful	  coexistence”,	  “harmonious	  development”,	  “mutual	  assistance	  and	  harmony”	  and	  “the	  construction	  of	  socialist	  modernization”).	  In	  the	  period	  that	  harmonious	  society	  and	  world	  have	  been	  promoted,	  however,	  waves	  of	  riots	  and	  self-­‐immolations	  carried	  out	  by	  members	  of	  China’s	  ethnic	  minorities	  should	  make	  it	  abundantly	  clear	  that	  not	  everyone	  wants	  to	  be	  equal	  on	  the	  Chinese	  party-­‐state’s	  terms.96	  Similarly,	  a	  white	  paper	  on	  China’s	  Political	  Party	  System	  used	  “the	  multi-­‐party	  cooperation	  system”	  to	  exemplify	  harmony	  with	  difference,	  because	  “[i]t	  reflects	  the	  fine	  cultural	  tradition	  of	  the	  Chinese	  nation,	  which	  features	  all-­‐embracing	  and	  harmony	  while	  reserving	  differences”.97	  Although	  it	  certainly	  does	  allow	  for	  people	  not	  to	  join	  the	  CCP	  (which	  in	  fact	  consists	  of	  a	  privileged	  minority),	  it	  seems	  ludicrous	  to	  argue	  that	  China’s	  60	  years	  of	  CCP	  rule	  represents	  some	  form	  of	  equality	  between	  parties.	  Rather,	  it	  exemplifies	  how	  hierarchically	  organised	  the	  party-­‐state	  version	  of	  “harmony	  with	  difference”	  is.	  In	  this	  hierarchical	  ordering	  of	  difference,	  other	  parties	  are	  reduced	  to	  rubber-­‐stamping	  centrally	  made	  decisions	  in	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Political	  Consultative	  Conference	  (CPPCC),	  and	  real	  opposition	  is	  staunchly	  and	  often	  violently	  opposed	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Liu	  Xiaobo	  or	  the	  Dalai	  Lama.	  Both	  these	  critical	  individuals	  have	  been	  labelled	  as	  not	  “harmonious”	  by	  the	  party	  state,	  in	  efforts	  to	  delegitimise	  their	  respective	  causes.98	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Contradictions	  and	  depoliticisation	  in	  harmony	  With	  Hu’s	  speech	  to	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  subsequent	  white	  paper,	  the	  foundations	  were	  laid	  for	  the	  vast	  proliferation	  of	  “harmonious	  world”	  that	  has	  since	  been	  seen,	  precisely	  in	  order	  to	  “get	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  to	  understand	  China”.	  After	  2005,	  the	  term	  became	  a	  staple	  in	  the	  PRC	  government’s	  work	  reports,99	  in	  white	  papers	  on	  its	  relations	  with	  the	  world,100	  and	  in	  speeches	  by	  government	  officials	  including	  then	  President	  Hu,101	  Premier	  Wen	  Jiabao,102	  Foreign	  Minister	  Yang	  Jiechi,103	  as	  well	  as	  lower	  ranking	  officials104	  and	  ambassadors.105	  Current	  President	  Xi	  Jinping	  also	  deployed	  the	  concept	  in	  his	  period	  of	  grooming	  for	  take-­‐over	  after	  Hu’s	  retirement	  in	  2012.106	  “Harmonious	  world”	  has	  been	  used	  to	  motivate	  and	  promote	  a	  plethora	  of	  things	  and	  positions,	  from	  the	  party-­‐state’s	  stance	  on	  border	  politics,107	  the	  Nanjing	  massacre108	  and	  cyber-­‐control,109	  to	  Chinese	  language	  and	  Confucius	  Institutes,110	  the	  12th	  five-­‐year	  plan111	  and	  fashion.112	  It	  has	  been	  deployed	  for	  similar	  purposes	  and	  retaining	  the	  same	  formulations	  in	  numerous	  languages.113	  The	  coherence	  of	  the	  politics	  that	  can	  be	  developed	  from	  “harmony”	  should	  therefore	  not	  be	  overstated.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  similar	  to	  “democracy”	  in	  that	  it	  can	  be	  rhetorically	  deployed	  for	  multiple	  purposes,	  including	  ones	  that	  may	  appear	  to	  many	  quite	  contrary	  to	  its	  own	  purported	  aims.	  The	  party-­‐state	  version	  of	  harmonious	  world	  has	  then	  been	  deployed	  to	  “do”	  various	  concrete	  things	  in	  Chinese	  international	  politics.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  imagining	  difference,	  it	  appears	  to	  share	  our	  concern	  here	  with	  multiplicity	  and	  openness.	  However,	  groups	  and	  cultures	  are	  described	  in	  ways	  that	  correspond	  with	  David	  Kerr’s	  “blending	  diversity	  under	  universalism”,114	  which	  tends	  towards	  an	  imagination	  of	  difference	  as	  hierarchically	  ordered,	  and	  sometimes	  as	  something	  that	  should	  be	  eliminated.	  The	  future	  harmonious	  world	  is	  envisaged	  as	  an	  “inevitable	  choice”,	  and	  China	  is	  imagined	  as	  having	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  this	  future	  because	  of	  its	  purported	  harmonious	  nature	  based	  on	  history.	  It	  is	  inevitable,	  yet	  needs	  to	  be	  constructed	  and	  fostered.	  Against	  this	  background,	  “harmonious	  world”	  is	  said	  by	  some	  to	  indicate	  “an	  increasingly	  confident	  China	  relinquishing	  its	  aloofness	  to	  participate	  and	  undertake	  greater	  responsibilities	  in	  international	  affairs”.115	  Nonetheless,	  the	  term	  remains	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  a	  “catch	  all”	  phrase	  of	  friendly	  connotations.	  “Harmonious	  world”	  may	  be	  useful	  precisely	  because	  of	  its	  vague	  and	  elusive	  implications,	  that	  nonetheless	  speak	  to	  both	  Chinese	  and	  non-­‐Chinese	  sensibilities.	  Indeed,	  “who	  could	  argue	  against	  global	  peace	  and	  prosperity?”.116	  Nonetheless,	  what	  emerges	  from	  accounts	  of	  harmony	  as	  articulated	  in	  China	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  is	  a	  tension	  in	  the	  harmony	  concept	  between	  its	  need	  for	  multiplicity	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  its	  presupposition	  of	  universalisability	  on	  the	  other.	  Bart	  Rockman	  has	  suggested	  that	  harmony	  may	  be	  a	  “necessary	  glue	  without	  which	  neither	  a	  society	  nor	  a	  polity	  are	  sustainable”,	  but	  that	  “complete	  social	  harmony	  is	  ultimately	  suffocating	  and	  illiberal”.117	  Jacob	  Torfing	  has	  also	  taken	  issue	  with	  predominant	  understandings	  of	  harmony	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  that	  he	  argues	  present	  a	  “post-­‐political	  vision	  of	  politics	  and	  governance	  that	  tends	  to	  eliminate	  power	  and	  antagonism”.118	  Drawing	  on	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe,	  he	  understands	  such	  a	  post-­‐political	  vision	  as	  both	  theoretically	  unsustainable	  and	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politically	  dangerous.	  It	  is	  unsustainable	  because	  power	  and	  antagonism	  are	  inevitable	  features	  of	  the	  political	  dimensions	  of	  politics.	  Therefore	  politics:	  cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   question	   of	   translating	   diverging	   interests	   into	  effective	  [win-­‐win]	  policy	  solutions,	  since	  that	  can	  be	  done	  in	  an	  entirely	  de-­‐politicized	   fashion,	   for	   example,	   by	   applying	   a	   particular	   decision-­‐making	   rule,	   relying	   on	   a	   certain	   rationality	   or	   appealing	   to	   a	   set	   of	  undisputed	   virtues	   and	   values.	   Of	   course,	   politics	   always	   invokes	  particular	   rules,	   rationalities	   and	   values,	   but	   the	   political	   dimension	   of	  politics	  is	  precisely	  what	  escapes	  all	  this.119	  	  Politics,	  then,	  unavoidably	  involves	  a	  choice	  that	  means	  eliminating	  alternative	  options.	  Moreover,	  although	  we	  base	  our	  decisions	  on	  reasons	  and	  may	  have	  strong	  motivations	  for	  choosing	  what	  we	  choose,	  we	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  ultimate	  ground	  for	  any	  given	  choice	  –	  in	  Derridean	  terms,	  such	  grounds	  will	  always	  be	  indefinitely	  deferred.	  Therefore,	  “the	  ultimate	  decision	  will	  have	  to	  rely	  on	  a	  skilful	  combination	  of	  rhetorical	  strategies	  and	  the	  use	  of	  force”.120	  The	  acts	  of	  exclusion	  that	  politics	  necessarily	  entails	  will	  produce	  antagonism	  between	  those	  who	  identify	  with	  the	  included	  options	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  attempt	  by	  the	  promoters	  of	  harmony	  to	  dissociate	  harmonious	  politics	  from	  the	  exercise	  of	  power,	  force	  and	  the	  production	  of	  antagonism,	  claiming	  a	  harmony	  where	  everyone	  wins	  and	  no-­‐one	  looses,	  is	  bound	  to	  fail.	  Moreover,	  the	  post-­‐political	  vision	  of	  politics	  and	  harmony	  is	  dangerous	  because	  its	  denial	  of	  antagonism	  will	  tend	  to	  alienate	  those	  excluded	  from	  consideration.	  This,	  Torfing	  writes,	  will	  tend	  to	  displace	  antagonistic	  struggles	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  political	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  morals,	  “where	  conflicts	  are	  based	  on	  non-­‐negotiable	  values	  and	  the	  manifestation	  of	  ‘authentic’	  identities”.121	  Such	  non-­‐negotiable	  values	  would	  be	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  co-­‐operative	  harmony	  sought.	  To	  both	  Rockman	  and	  Torfing,	  then,	  complete	  or	  perfect	  harmony	  will	  defeat	  harmony	  and	  create	  disharmony.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  excessive	  production	  of	  harmony	  is	  what	  produces	  the	  disharmonious	  elements	  that	  come	  to	  threaten	  it.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  happening	  in	  contemporary	  China,	  where	  the	  “harmonising”	  policies	  enforced	  under	  the	  “harmonious	  society”	  slogan	  have	  produced	  a	  range	  of	  oppositional	  movements,	  from	  Chinese	  youth	  mocking	  harmony	  online122	  to	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  self-­‐imolations	  we	  currently	  witness	  in	  and	  around	  Tibet.123	  Numerous	  scholars	  argue	  that	  in	  order	  to	  imagine	  harmony,	  we	  need	  to	  imagine	  heterogeneity	  and	  multiplicity.	  We	  can	  now	  add	  that	  the	  problematic	  organisation	  of	  difference	  that	  remains	  in	  imaginations	  of	  harmonious	  world	  eliminates	  the	  multiplicity	  in	  the	  here-­‐now	  that	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  harmony.	  What	  these	  renditions	  of	  harmony	  show,	  I	  believe,	  is	  that	  the	  tensions	  in	  and	  logics	  of	  harmony	  are	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  that	  are	  described	  by	  Derrida	  and	  others	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  autoimmune.	  What	  we	  see	  in	  these	  accounts	  is	  an	  irresolvable	  contradiction,	  which	  mirrors	  the	  autoimmune	  logic	  outlined	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  article.	  Harmony	  must	  by	  definition	  be	  universal,	  but	  its	  universalisation	  by	  definition	  makes	  harmony	  impossible.	  In	  this	  respect	  harmony	  works	  on	  a	  self-­‐defeating	  and	  self-­‐perpetuating	  logic	  that	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  what	  we	  saw	  described	  in	  the	  “modern	  West”	  and	  in	  “democracy”.	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Sending	  harmony	  away	  (and	  back	  again)	  To	  further	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  autoimmune	  nature	  of	  harmony,	  we	  can	  draw	  on	  Derrida’s	  discussion	  of	  autoimmunity	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  term	  
renvoyer.	  This	  term	  means	  re-­‐sending,	  sending	  away,	  sending	  back	  (to	  the	  source)	  and/or	  sending	  on.124	  Derrida	  explains	  that	  the	  autoimmune	  process	  “consists	  always	  in	  a	  renvoi,	  a	  referral	  or	  deferral,	  a	  sending	  or	  putting	  off”.125	  Thus,	  the	  autoimmunity	  of	  harmony	  in	  space	  demands	  that	  harmony	  be	  sent	  off	  elsewhere,	  excluded,	  rejected.	  It	  must	  be	  expelled	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  protecting	  it,	  precisely	  by	  rejecting	  or	  sending	  off	  to	  the	  outside	  the	  disharmonious	  elements	  inside	  it.126	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  such	  exiling	  does	  not	  take	  place	  only	  in	  democracy,	  as	  Derrida	  and	  others	  implied,	  but	  also	  in	  harmony.	  It	  is	  the	  expulsion	  of	  internal	  ills	  that	  has	  been	  promoted	  by	  Hu’s	  harmony.	  It	  has	  been	  criticised	  by	  theorists	  of	  difference	  in	  IR.	  Moreover,	  “since	  the	  renvoi	  operates	  in	  time	  as	  well,	  autoimmunity	  also	  calls	  for	  putting	  off	  [renvoyer]	  until	  later	  elections	  and	  the	  advent	  of	  democracy”.127	  So	  too	  does	  it	  postpone	  the	  coming	  of	  harmony.	  Here,	  truly	  “harmonious”	  behaviour	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  postponed	  until	  more	  harmonious	  times.	  China	  needs	  to	  become	  strong	  first,	  be	  in	  control	  of	  harmony	  on	  the	  inside	  first.	  This	  renvoi	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  to	  harmony,	  no	  self	  with	  which	  harmony	  can	  be	  self-­‐same.	  To	  paraphrase	  Derrida,	  this	  double	  renvoi	  (sending	  off	  –	  or	  to	  –	  the	  other	  and	  putting	  off,	  adjournment)	  is	  an	  autoimmune	  fatality	  or	  necessity.	  It	  is	  inscribed	  
directly	  in	  a	  harmony	  devoid	  of	  self-­‐sameness.	  It	  is	  a	  harmony	  of	  which	  the	  concept	  remains	  free	  in	  the	  play	  of	  its	  indetermination.	  It	  is	  inscribed	  directly	  in	  this	  thing	  or	  this	  cause	  that,	  precisely	  under	  the	  name	  of	  harmony,	  is	  never	  properly	  what	  it	  is,	  never	  itself.	  For	  what	  is	  lacking	  in	  harmony	  is	  the	  very	  meaning	  of	  the	  selfsame.	  It	  defines	  harmony,	  and	  the	  very	  ideal	  of	  harmony,	  by	  this	  lack	  of	  the	  selfsame.128	  	  The	  autoimmune	  Chinese	  system	  is	  not	  only	  a	  process	  by	  which	  harmony	  attacks	  a	  part	  of	  itself.	  This	  renvoi,	  moreover,	  consists	  in	  a	  deferral	  or	  referral	  to	  the	  other:	  as	  the	  undeniable,	  and	  I	  underscore	  undeniable,	  experience	  of	  the	  alterity	  of	  the	  other,	  of	  heterogeneity,	  of	  the	  singular,	  the	  not-­‐same,	  the	  different,	  the	  dissymmetric,	  the	  heteronomous.129	  	  By	  undeniable,	  here,	  Derrida	  also	  means	  that	  it	  is	  only	  deniable.	  The	  only	  way	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  protect	  meaning	  is	  through	  a	  sending-­‐off	  (renvoi)	  by	  way	  of	  denial.	  Harmony,	  like	  democracy,	  is	  what	  it	  is	  only	  by	  deferring	  itself	  and	  differing	  from	  itself.	  Although	  it	  strives	  to	  self-­‐perfection	  through	  self-­‐critique,	  harmony	  can	  never	  achieve	  the	  indivisibility	  that	  it	  claims	  as	  its	  prerequisite.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  tries	  to	  do	  so,	  it	  must	  enforce	  its	  law	  with	  force	  (disharmony).	  In	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  impossible.	  
Conclusion:	  the	  autoimmunity	  of	  autoimmunity	  In	  this	  article	  I	  have	  shown	  the	  claim	  that	  “democracy	  would	  be	  the	  name	  of	  the	  only	  ‘regime’	  that	  presupposes	  its	  own	  perfectibility”	  to	  be	  highly	  questionable.130	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  impetus	  to	  call	  the	  Chinese	  processes	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and	  ideas	  that	  I	  have	  examined	  above	  “democracy”.	  Yet,	  they	  operate	  on	  the	  same	  autoimmune	  logic	  that	  Derrida	  and	  others	  take	  as	  giving	  “democracy”	  its	  future.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Chinese	  “harmony”	  is	  autoimmune	  in	  a	  similar	  manner,	  and	  its	  openness	  to	  the	  future	  to	  come	  should	  be	  recognised.	  If	  we	  can	  detect	  an	  autoimmune	  logic	  at	  work,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  “modern	  West”,	  Europe	  and	  democracy,	  but	  also	  in	  China’s	  harmonious	  system,	  we	  have	  cause	  to	  revisit	  accounts	  of	  the	  autoimmune	  and	  ask	  how	  this	  may	  affect	  our	  understanding	  of	  such	  accounts.	  We	  have	  seen	  how	  notions	  of	  autoimmunity	  purport	  to	  offer	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  beyond	  a	  problematic	  logic	  that	  closes	  down	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  future.	  Yet	  their	  own	  treatment	  of	  other	  systems	  falls	  into	  the	  same	  trap.	  If	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  future	  hinges	  on	  autoimmune	  logics	  at	  work	  in	  a	  given	  system,	  then	  the	  denial	  of	  such	  conjoined	  self-­‐defeat	  and	  self-­‐perfectibility	  in	  a	  system	  means	  denying	  that	  system	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  future.	  It	  means	  denying	  that	  system	  the	  possibility	  of	  change.	  Through	  showing	  the	  autoimmune	  logics	  at	  work	  in	  harmony,	  I	  have	  aimed	  in	  this	  article	  to	  show	  how	  such	  a	  future	  is	  also	  open	  for	  China.	  By	  extension,	  we	  can	  imagine	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  logic	  at	  play	  also	  in	  other	  systems,	  in	  other	  times	  and	  places.	  Against	  this	  background,	  it	  remains	  important	  to	  recognise	  the	  Western-­‐centric	  move	  in	  thinking	  about	  autoimmunity,	  including	  by	  Derrida.	  His	  denial	  of	  a	  future	  to	  systems	  other	  than	  that	  of	  his	  own	  spatio-­‐temporal	  configuration	  is	  as	  problematic	  as	  that	  of	  other	  accounts.	  It	  is	  time	  then	  to	  ask:	  What	  is	  the	  function	  of	  this	  expulsion	  of	  China	  or	  the	  Far	  East	  from	  accounts	  of	  the	  autoimmune?	  In	  querying	  this	  expulsion	  we	  can	  draw	  again	  on	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  the	  renvoi,	  echoing	  the	  above	  discussion	  of	  harmony.	  Contemporary	  thought	  on	  autoimmunity	  immunises	  itself	  against	  Chinese	  thought	  precisely	  through	  its	  renvoi	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  It	  maintains	  its	  claim	  to	  exceptionality	  through	  purifying	  itself	  and	  pretending	  to	  a	  clean	  time	  and	  space	  where	  “Western	  thought”,	  “democracy”	  or	  “modernity”	  can	  be	  treated	  in	  isolation.	  In	  this	  way,	  thought	  on	  autoimmunity	  performs	  the	  very	  thing	  it	  describes:	  its	  account	  of	  autoimmunity	  is	  itself	  autoimmune.	  It	  operates	  on	  a	  non-­‐recognition	  of	  the	  other	  in	  the	  self.	  It	  tries	  to	  expunge	  its	  other,	  precisely	  through	  a	  renvoi.	  This	  other	  of	  the	  “modern	  Western”	  autoimmune	  must	  be	  expelled	  under	  the	  pretext	  of	  protecting	  it,	  precisely	  by	  rejecting	  or	  sending	  off	  to	  the	  outside	  the	  disharmonious	  or	  “non-­‐Western”	  elements	  inside	  it.131	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  renvoi	  operates	  in	  time	  as	  well,	  autoimmunity	  also	  calls	  for	  putting	  off	  [renvoyer]	  until	  later	  the	  recognition	  of	  this	  other	  in	  the	  autoimmune	  logic.132	  This	  renvoi	  shows	  that	  just	  as	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  to	  harmony,	  there	  is	  no	  essence	  to	  the	  autoimmune,	  no	  self	  with	  which	  the	  autoimmune	  system	  can	  be	  self-­‐same.	  In	  Derrida’s	  very	  own	  texts,	  this	  double	  renvoi	  is	  another	  autoimmune	  fatality	  or	  necessity.	  It	  is	  worth	  highlighting	  again	  that	  deconstruction	  never	  pretended	  to	  do	  without	  exclusion,	  but	  rather	  to	  draw	  our	  attention	  to	  particular	  exclusions	  and	  put	  into	  question	  their	  stability.	  In	  this	  article	  I	  have	  drawn	  attention	  to	  the	  particular	  exclusion	  of	  Chinese	  thought	  from	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  autoimmune.	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  openness	  of	  the	  Chinese	  system	  of	  harmonism.	  This	  shedding	  light	  has	  come	  with	  its	  own	  selective	  obscuring,	  exclusions	  and	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closures,	  which	  are	  no	  more	  stable	  or	  secure	  than	  those	  I	  have	  discussed	  in	  this	  article.	  Put	  differently,	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  open	  autoimmunity	  up	  to	  this	  openness	  of	  Chinese	  harmony,	  this	  expunged	  other.	  This	  openness,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  separable	  from	  closure.	  	  The	  immunitary	  logic	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  autoimmunity.133Without	  differentiation,	  hostility	  or	  exclusion	  in	  some	  form,	  with	  total	  sameness,	  holism	  or	  inclusion,	  everything	  would	  fall	  back	  into	  the	  One.	  That	  would	  mean	  the	  end	  to	  change,	  to	  time,	  to	  life	  –	  because,	  again,	  how	  could	  anything	  new	  emerge	  from	  something	  that	  is	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  self-­‐same?134	  For	  this	  reason,	  a	  second	  effect	  of	  the	  renvoi	  of	  the	  (Chinese)	  other	  from	  autoimmunity	  is	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  future	  to	  that	  very	  autoimmune	  modern	  “West”	  and	  European	  democracy	  that	  has	  expelled	  it.	  The	  positioning	  of	  this	  non-­‐Western,	  non-­‐democratic	  other	  figures	  as	  a	  threat	  and	  an	  opportunity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  this	  “West”,	  this	  “democracy”.	  It	  is	  an	  other	  to	  which	  contemporary	  accounts	  try	  to	  immunise	  themselves,	  but	  to	  which	  this	  thought	  cannot	  achieve	  absolute	  immunity.	  Through	  the	  threat	  of	  infiltration	  it	  poses	  to	  an	  autoimmune	  democracy	  and	  modern	  West,	  it	  paradoxicaly	  offers	  that	  system	  the	  opportunity	  for	  openness	  and	  hospitality	  to	  the	  potential	  coming	  of	  this	  excluded	  other.	  Perhaps	  the	  denial	  of	  a	  future	  to	  this	  excluded	  other	  of	  contemporary	  thinking	  of	  the	  Western	  autoimmune	  system	  is	  precisely	  what	  makes	  the	  future	  of	  that	  modern	  Western	  democracy	  possible.	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